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Abstract
The cluster innovation network is an important part of regional economic development. In
addition, the fairness preference of internal innovators in the processes of investment and
benefit distribution are particularly important for curbing "free riding" and other speculative
behaviors and for creating a good cooperation environment. Therefore, taking a cluster
innovation network constructed by the weighted evolutionary BBV model as the research
subject, this paper constructs an evolutionary gamemodel of a cluster innovation network
based on a spatial public goods game and the theory of fairness preferences, which involves
the processes of investment and payoff allocation. Using simulation analysis, this paper
studies the evolution of innovators’ cooperative behaviors and benefits in cluster innovation
network under the conditions of a fairness preference and a return intensity. The results
show that an increase in the weight coefficient, gain coefficient and degree of differentiation
between the previous income and current investment can effectively promote improvements
in the level of enterprise cooperation. Indeed, the greater the weight coefficient, the gain
coefficient and the degree of differentiation are, the more substantial the improvement in the
level of enterprise cooperation will be. Moreover, an improvement in the differentiation of the
breadth and depth of enterprise cooperation has an inhibitory effect on enterprise coopera-
tion. Furthermore, whereas increases in regulation and gain coefficients can effectively pro-
mote enterprise cooperation. However, the increase in the weight coefficient has a different
effect on enterprise benefit in terms of the breadth and depth of cooperation. Finally, we
hope to improve the overall cooperation level and cooperation income of the network by
deeply understanding the fair preferences of innovators in the processes of investment and
benefit distribution, which is helpful for promoting the evolution and development of cluster
innovation networks.
1 Introduction
Cluster innovation networks are an innovative organizational form designed to accelerate
the development of cooperative innovation and to improve knowledge level and innovation
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ability, which have become indispensable part of China’s regional innovation system. Since
clusters possess the characteristics of geographical proximity and knowledge spillovers[1],
the knowledge and technology of innovators exhibit the attributes of "public goods"[2]. In the
process of cooperative innovation, speculation[3] such as "hitchhiking" and "betrayal" often
occurs, and it seriously damages the cooperative environment of the cluster innovation net-
work. Additionally, the fairness preference[4] and moderate return intensity[5] in the process
of investment and the payoff allocation of innovators can effectively inhibit the emergence
of these speculative activities. In addition, in the actual network evolution game process, the
cooperation behavior of innovators is not only influenced by the network structure but also
closely related to the intensity of the cooperative relationship between innovators[6], that is,
the connection in the real network has the weight attribute. According to the existing research,
a real network with connected weights has both the power-law distribution characteristics of
the degree distribution and the power-law distribution characteristics of the strength distribu-
tion[7]. The weighted scale-free network constructed based on the weighted evolutionary BBV
model can simulate a real network very well [8]. Therefore, we take a weighted scale-free clus-
ter innovation network as the research subject. By considering the interaction between cooper-
ative behavior of innovators and the network structure and analyzing the evolution of the
cluster innovation network under the given fairness preferences and return intensity, we
can avoid problems such as hitchhiking and cooperation inertia(among others), and improve
both overall level of cooperation and the cooperative benefit of the network. This result is very
significant for promoting the evolution and development of a cluster innovation network.
From the perspective of game theory, the cooperative game process among innovators in
cluster innovation networks can be regarded as a spatial public goods game[9]. Because the
betrayer’s income is often higher than the cooperator’s income, the cooperative dilemma
of the "tragedy of the commons" occurs[10]. To resolve this dilemma, some scholars have
found that volunteer[11], reputation[12], reward[13] and punishment[14] mechanisms can
improve the level of cooperation in the network. Some scholars have also found that fixed
static network structures such as rule networks[15], small-world networks[16] and scale-free
networks[17] can also promote cooperation under certain conditions[18]. Santos et al [19]
discovered that the fairness preference of innovative subject cooperative behavior can greatly
affect the level of cooperation in BA network. Many scholars have begun to supplement
and improve fairness preference theory in the context of a spatial public goods game on the
network in three main ways. First, scholars seek to improve the investment process in a spa-
tial public goods game and to study the influence of the investment fairness preference of
innovators on the cooperation levels in the network. For example, some researchers have
improved the investment fairness preference according to the degree value of the game sub-
ject[20–21] and have found that in the static rule network, a high-quality group preference
can greatly enhance the cooperation level of the innovators. Other scholars have improved
the investment fairness preference according to the previous income of the game subject[22]
and have found that in the static BA network, the degree of investment differentiation
increases, which can promote the cooperation level in the network. In addition, some studies
have improved the investment fairness preference according to the cooperation proportion
of the game subject in the neighborhood[23–25]. These studies that in the static rule net-
work, a small increase in the investment heterogeneity can rapidly increase the cooperation
level in the network. Second, studies have sought to improve the payoff allocation process in
the spatial public goods game and have examined the impacts of payoff allocation fairness
preferences on the cooperation levels in the network. For example, some researchers
improved the payoff allocation fairness preferences according to the degree value of the
game subject[26]. These researches found that in a static BA network, when the degree of
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differentiation in the payoff allocation is low, the level of cooperation in the network can be
higher. Other scholars have improved the payoff allocation fairness preference according to
the cooperation proportion in the neighborhood of the game subject[27]. These scholars
found that in a static BA network, the greater the degree of differentiation in the payoff allo-
cation is, the higher the level of cooperation in the network will be. In addition, some schol-
ars improved the payoff allocation fairness preference according to the previous income of
the players[28] and have found that in a static BA network, the level of cooperation in the
network will increase significantly only when the degree of differentiation in the distribution
of interests is above a certain threshold. Third, the existing research has improved the invest-
ment and payoff allocation process in the spatial public goods game, and it studied the
impacts of the investment and payoff allocation fairness preference of innovators cooperative
behavior on the cooperation level and cooperative benefit in a network. For example, some
researchers have improved the investment and payoff allocation according to the degree
value and the current investment the game subject[29]. They have found that in static BA
networks, when the innovators’ neighbors allocate excessive benefits, the level and benefits
of cooperation in the network can be significantly improved. Some scholars have improved
the investment and payoff allocation according to the previous income and current invest-
ment[30]. These scholars found that in static regular networks, an increase in the investment
differentiation can promote cooperation and increase the cooperative benefits in a network.
In addition, other researchers improved the investment and payoff allocations according to
the degree value, previous income, current investment and degree value[31]. These research-
ers found that in static BA networks, moderate enterprise degree can promote the formation
of an interest community. Moreover, the improvement in the gain level is an important
source of the increase in the average income and the emergence of cooperation.
In light of the existing research, the research on evolutionary games in cluster innovation
networks based on the fairness preference has been substantial. Most studies are based on
an established static network structure and analyze the evolution of innovators’ cooperative
behavior under fairness preference in the spatial public goods game. However, the existing
research still has the following shortcomings: (1) it has been under an established static net-
work structure, and does not consider dynamic changes in the network structure; (2) because
scholars mostly use weightless networks (such as rule networks, small world networks and BA
scale-free networks) as the network model, weighted networks with a network relationship
strength are seldom examined; (3) while existing research mainly improves the rules of payoff
allocation from the degree value, current investment and cooperation proportions, it ignores
the impact of the intensity of cooperation among innovators on the process of payoff alloca-
tion; and (4) last, scholars mostly aim to improve the level of cooperation in the network
through the improvement of the fairness preferences for the investment and payoff allocation
Thus, scholars have neglected to consider the return intensity and the cooperative benefits of
innovators. In light of these limitations, the present paper takes the cluster innovation network
constructed by the weighted evolutionary BBV model as the research object and, based on the
spatial public goods game model and fairness preference theory, constructs an evolutionary
game model of the cluster innovation network that combines the process of investment and
payoff allocation. Using the MATLAB 2017b software, this research simulates and analyzes the
evolution of cooperative behavior and the cooperative benefits of innovators in cluster innova-
tion networks under a fairness preference and return intensity, which has important theoreti-
cal significance and practical relevance for revealing the evolution mechanism of cluster
innovation networks and promoting their development.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model with network evolution
analysis is presented in Section 2. Then, the model with heterogeneity of both the investment
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and payoff allocations is constructed in Section 3. Subsequently, the corresponding simulation
results are given in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section 5.
2 Evolution analysis of the cluster innovation network under the
fairness preference
Innovators in cluster innovation networks often show strong preferences for fairness in the
process of cooperation[4], as they seek to maximize their own payoffs but also consider the
fairness of the investment and payoff allocation[31]. The investment and payoff allocations
are complementary processes that are independent and interrelated; that is, investment is an
important prerequisite for the payoff allocation, and in turn, the payoff allocation is the main
reference for the next round of investment. Therefore, from the perspective of the fairness
preferences in the process of investment and payoff allocation, this paper analyzes the evolu-
tion process of cluster innovation networks.
The fairness preference of innovators for cooperative behavior is related to the scale of
innovators and the intensity of their cooperative relationships. Among these factors, the
strength and innovation abilities of innovators at different scales are different. The scale of the
innovators greatly affects their investment fairness preferences, which can be reflected by the
cooperation breadth of the nodes in cluster innovation networks. The cooperative R&D capa-
bility, trust and knowledge transfer efficiency of different cooperation intensity among innova-
tors are also different. The cooperation intensity among innovators greatly affect the process
of the payoff allocation of innovators, which can be reflected by the cooperation depth between
the nodes in cluster innovation networks. Based on the relevant literature[31], to reflect the
degree of differentiation in the fairness preference between the investment and payoff alloca-
tion and the importance degree of each index this paper uses the adjustment coefficient to
reflect the different degree of fairness preference between the investment and payoff allocation
in terms of the previous income, current investment, cooperation breadth and cooperation
depth. Furthermore, the weight coefficient is used to reflect the degree of importance of the
fairness preference between the investment and payoff allocation in the previous income, cur-
rent investment, cooperation breadth and cooperation depth. In addition, since the return
intensity is an important factor that affect the cooperative behavior and the cooperative
income of the innovators in the process of the game, this paper uses the gain coefficient to
adjust the return intensity from the investment cost to the income of the innovators in the pro-
cess of the cooperative game [32].
In the process of the cooperative game, innovators in cluster innovation networks will
adjust their cooperative strategies according to the Fermi rule [33], then change their coop-
erative behavior. At the same time, network nodes will adjust their cooperative goals accord-
ing to the reconnection mechanism with preferred connections [34], which will change the
network structure. As a result of the interaction between the network structure and innova-
tors’ cooperative behavior, the cluster innovation network’s structure exhibits dynamic
evolution.
Accordingly, this paper constructs an evolutionary analysis framework of a cluster innova-
tion network under the given fairness preferences, as shown in Fig 1. By embedding the fair-
ness preference of innovators’ cooperative behavior into the game model of the process of
investment and payoff allocation, and under the influence of the fairness preferences and
return intensity, this paper reveals the evolution of cooperative behavior and the income of
innovators in the dynamic change process of a cluster innovation network. It is of vital to pro-
mote the evolution and development of cluster innovation networks.
Evolutionary gamemodel and simulation of a cluster innovation network based on fairness preference
PLOSONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777 January 13, 2020 4 / 17
3 Evolutionary gamemodel of a cluster innovation network based
on fairness preferences
3.1 Basic hypothesis of the game model
In cluster innovation networks, nodes represent cluster enterprises, links represent the game
relationships between innovators, and link weights represent the strength of the cooperative
relationships between innovators. The innovators in the network update their own strategies
according to the rules and adjust their relationships through the reconnection mechanism
with preferential connections until the cooperative strategies of the innovators and the
relationships between them reach a stable state. Based on the characteristics of the cluster
innovation network structure and a realistic consideration of the game model, the following
hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1: In the process of the game, the cooperative relationships between innovators are
adjusted only according to the reconnection mechanism with preferential connections, the
adjustments are made without considering the growth of nodes and edges in the network.
Hypothesis 2: In the process of the game, the innovators x with degree value kx only participate
in the game between the neighborhood centered on itself and neighborhood centered.
Moreover, there is a total degree value of kx + 1 in the neighborhood, and all of the nodes in
the network have the same total investment C = 1.
Hypothesis 3: The innovators in the network are all limited rational individuals and can only
choose two strategies: cooperation and noncooperation.
3.2 Construction of the game model
In the first round (tn = 1) of the public goods game, the degree value of enterprise x is kx, so if
enterprise x chooses an uncooperative strategy (Sx = 0), the investment of enterprise x in its
neighborhood is 0. However, if enterprise x chooses a cooperative strategy (Sx = 1), it partici-
pates in kx + 1 neighborhoods centered on itself and neighbors, and its total investment is
evenly distributed among all kx + 1 neighborhoods. At this time, the investment in the neigh-




; if Sx ¼ 1 and tn ¼ 1 ð1Þ
In the process of the public goods game in round tn (tn� 2), if enterprise x chooses cooper-
ative strategy (Sx = 1), then it allocates the investment of one of its neighborhood ŷ (the
Fig 1. Evolution analysis framework of cluster innovation networks under fairness preferences.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.g001
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neighborhood composed of neighborhood enterprise y as the center and directly connected
enterprises) according to Eqs (2) and (3):
Ix;ŷðtnÞ ¼ C • �Dx;ŷðtnÞ ð2Þ


















; if Sx ¼ 1 and tn � 2 ð3Þ
Among these variables, because that the total investment of each enterprise is 1, Dx;ŷðtnÞ is
normalized according to the min-max normalization method. �Dx;ŷðtnÞ is the normalized value
of Dx;ŷðtnÞ, tn is the number of rounds of the public goods game (only if all of the nodes in the
network have a specific round of the game to end the round of game), Ix;ŷðtnÞ is the input of
enterprise x to neighborhood ŷ in round the tn of the public goods game, andmi;ŷðtn 1Þ is
the revenue of enterprise i from neighborhood ŷ after the first round tn−1 of the public goods
game. andmx;ŷðtn 1Þ is the revenue of enterprise x from neighborhood ŷ after the first round
tn−1 of the public goods game. When i = 0 denotes enterprise y itself, ky denotes the degree
value of enterprise y. Eq (3) shows that the investment of enterprise x in neighborhood ŷ is
mainly measured by the previous income and degree value. Among these values, the profitabil-
ity of neighborhood ŷ is expressed by the previous income. If enterprise x can obtain more
profits than other enterprises in neighborhood ŷ, then enterprise x will invest more in neigh-
borhood ŷ. The degree value represents the social status of enterprise x in neighborhood ŷ.
Enterprises with higher degree value will earn more investment in the next round of the game.
To measure the importance of the previous income and degree value in the process of enter-
prise investment, the weight coefficients 1-w1 and w1 are used, where 0� w1� 1. Moreover,
to reflect the degree of differentiation of the previous income and degree value in the process
of enterprise investment in the network, this paper uses the adjustment coefficient α1 [21].
When α1> 0, this implies greater prophase income and greater proportion of the degree
value, hence more investment is made in the neighborhood. When α1 = 0, the model is consis-
tent with the classical public goods game, and the input is distributed equally according to the
number of neighborhoods[35].
In round tn of the game, when the input of enterprise x into its neighbor y is over, the prof-
its from neighbor y are distributed according to Eq (4):




















Ii;ŷðtnÞ • SiðtnÞ   Ix;ŷðtnÞ • SxðtnÞ ð4Þ
Among these variables, r is the gain coefficient that used to measure the return intensity of
investment (r> 1), and
Pky
i¼0
Ii;ŷðtnÞ • SiðtnÞ is used to represent the total investment of all enter-
prises i in neighborhood ŷ. Eq (4) shows that the payoff allocation of enterprise x in neighbor-
hood ŷ is mainly measured by the current investment and the strength of the cooperative
relationships. Among these factors, the current investment reflects the investment ability in
neighborhood. The greater the investment of enterprise x in neighborhood ŷ is, the more
income enterprise x will earn from neighborhood ŷ. The strength of the cooperative relation-
ship indicates the degree of close cooperation in the relationship. The stronger the cooperative
relationship between the enterprises and their neighbors is, the more profits they will earn from
Evolutionary gamemodel and simulation of a cluster innovation network based on fairness preference
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their neighbors. To measure the importance of the current investment and cooperation inten-
sity in payoff allocation, the weight coefficients 1-w2 and w2 are used, respectively. In addition,
α2 is the adjustment coefficient, which is consistent with the meaning and function of α1.
Thus, after the end of round tn of the game, the total revenue obtained by enterprise x is the






Nodem in the cluster innovation network will randomly select a neighbor node n after each
round of the game to compare strategies. If prn> prm, nodem will imitate neighbor n’s game
strategy in the next round of the game with probabilityW. According to the Fermi update rule
[33], the imitation probability is as follows:
Wm!n ¼
1
1þ exp½ðprn   prmÞ=k�
ð6Þ
Here, k represents the intensity of the noise, that is, the interference of external factors on
the strategy learning process. When k! 0, the external factors will not interfere with the
node’s strategy learning; on the contrary, the node can only update its strategy randomly
because of the external factors. Considering the impact of the node revenue and strategy, this
paper selects a neutral noise factor K = 0.5 as the simulation parameter value.
When nodem selects the strategy of learning neighbor node n with probabilityW, it will
be reconnected with other non neighbor nodes in the network with probability Ums. In the
process of reconnection, only one edge is broken at a time; that is, the weight of the edge is
reduced by 1. Since the nodes have certain preferences when choosing partners, this paper
uses the reconnection mechanism with preferential connections [34] to determine the outgo-







Here, ps is the benefit of node s, G is the set where nodem is located, β is the preference ten-
dency, and β = 0 is the non preference connection tendency, that is, a random connection.
Conversely, the preference connection tendency is greater. This paper utilizes a high prefer-
ence of β = 1 for simulation.
4 Simulation analysis of a cluster innovation network evolution
game
4.1 Simulation steps
Step 1: Initialize the evolutionary game parameters, and according to the cluster innovation
network, randomly assign the two game strategies of "cooperation" and "noncooperation"
to each node in the network, with an initial cooperation level of 50%; that is, the network
cooperation density set at 0.5.
Step 2: In each round, all of the innovators play the game with their neighbors and accumulate
the cooperative benefits of the innovators according to the game model.
Evolutionary gamemodel and simulation of a cluster innovation network based on fairness preference
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Step 3: In each round of the game, all of the innovators update their strategies according to the
Fermi strategy rule (Eq (6)) and adjust their partners based on the reconnection mechanism
with preferential connections (Eq (7)).
Step 4: Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the number of Monte Carlo iterations is reached and the sim-
ulation is completed.
4.2 Setting and explaining of the simulation parameters
According to the evolutionary game model and the specific algorithm of cluster innovation
networks, and using the simulation platform of MATLAB 2017b, we set the simulation param-
eters for the evolutionary game of the cluster innovation network. These parameters are given
in Table 1.
In this paper, we use the generation mechanism of the weighted evolution BBV model to
produce a cluster innovation network with N = 100 nodes and an average degree of 4. The
maximum node degree is 31, the minimum node degree is 2, the maximum cooperation inten-
sity is 10, and the minimum cooperation intensity is 1. Each data point is the average of the
simulation results after 200 independent experiments. To ensure the accuracy of the research
results, this paper sets the number of game rounds to 500. After the system fully evolves to a
stable stage, the average of the last 50 cooperation densities is taken as Fc. Since the investment
rules and payoff allocations are complementary processes that promote each other, their con-
sistency should be maintained in the game. This paper assumes that the adjustment coefficient
α1 of inputs and the adjustment coefficient α2 of the payoff allocations have the same trend of
change. Moreover, the weight coefficients w1 and w2 also have the same trend of change, i.e.,
α = α1 = α2 and w = w1 = w2. In addition, to facilitate the analysis of the effect of the weight
coefficients of the fairness preferences on cooperative behavior and the cooperative benefits of
the innovators in the network, this paper uses Ruguo [31] and Li [36]. That is, w = 0 represents
the wealth preference mechanism, i.e., the processes of investment and payoff allocation are
determined by the previous income and the current investment, respectively. w = 0.5 repre-
sents the mixed preference mechanism, that is, the processes of investment and payoff alloca-
tion are determined by the previous income, the degree value, the current investment and the
intensity of the cooperation. and w = 1 represents the social preference mechanism, that is,
the processes of investment and payoff allocation are determined by the degree value and the
intensity of the cooperation, respectively.
4.3 Impact of the fairness preference and return intensity on the enterprise
cooperation level in cluster innovation network evolution
Fig 2 reflects the influence of the adjustment coefficient on the enterprise cooperation level
in the cluster innovation network under three mechanisms and different gain coefficients.
Observe in Fig 2 that under the wealth preference mechanism, with the increase in the adjust-
ment coefficient, the level of enterprise cooperation in the network shows a trend of first
decreasing, then rising, and finally stabilizing. When we have the adjustment coefficient α� 1,
along with the decrease of the difference degree of the previous income, degree value, current













500 100 4 31 2 10 1
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.t001
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investment and cooperation intensity, the cooperation level of the enterprises in the network
gradually decreases. Correspondingly, when we have the adjustment coefficient α> 1, with
the increase of the difference degree of the previous income, degree value, current investment
and cooperation intensity, the cooperation level of the enterprises in the network gradually
increases. The increase in the degree of differentiation of the previous income and current
investment can promote the level of enterprise cooperation. Compared with the wealth prefer-
ence mechanism, the change of enterprise cooperation level under the mixed preference mech-
anism is more volatile. The reason is that under the mixed preference mechanism, the linked
processes of investment and payoff allocation are affected by many factors, which makes enter-
prises more willing to change the existing cooperative relationship. Under the effects of the
reconnection mechanism, the network structure will change greatly. When the cluster innova-
tion network structure changes greatly, the changes will make the processes of the enterprise’s
investment and payoff allocation more complex, which affects the choice of the enterprise
cooperation strategy and leads to a greater fluctuation in the level of enterprise cooperation.
Under the social preference mechanism, with the increase in the adjustment coefficient, the
level of enterprise cooperation shows a gradual downward trend. This result is due to the
increase in differentiation with regard to the breadth and depth of the enterprise cooperation,
which renders more enterprises with less cooperation breadth and depth dissatisfied with the
existing earnings. As a result, these enterprises change their partners, so the network structure
changes. Whenever the network structure changes greatly, the profit margin of more enter-
prises is narrowed, which destroys the cooperative environment in the cluster. Thus cluster
enterprises gradually withdraw from cooperation, which inhibits the improvement of the level
of enterprise cooperation within the cluster [25]. In addition, the greater the differentiation
is in terms of the breadth and depth of the enterprise cooperation, the more significant the
interactions between the network structure and enterprise cooperative behaviors are, and the
greater the inhibitory effect on the enterprise cooperation level is. In a the real cluster innova-
tion network, the processes of enterprise investment and payoff allocation are affected by
Fig 2. The effect of the adjustment coefficient on the level of enterprise cooperation in cluster innovation network under three mechanisms and different
gain coefficients.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.g002
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many factors. Furthermore, excessive profit-seeking of enterprises in the processes of invest-
ment and payoff allocation is not conducive to the maintenance of cooperative relationships
among the enterprises in the network, which shows why it is difficult to have a high adjustment
coefficient in the game model and in the mixed preference mechanism. Therefore, the appro-
priate return intensity is very important to maintaining the level of enterprise cooperation in
the network and to promoting the healthy evolution and development of cluster innovation
networks.
Fig 3 shows the effect of the gain coefficient on the enterprise cooperation level in cluster
innovation networks under three mechanisms and different adjustment coefficients. Observe
in Fig 3 that under the wealth preference mechanism, with an increase in the gain coefficient,
the level of enterprise cooperation in the network first shows a stable trend, then the trend
rises and finally stabilizes. This observation demonstrates that the level of enterprise coopera-
tion in the network is only promoted when the return intensity exceeds a certain threshold,
and the stronger the return intensity will be, the more obvious the promotion effect on the
level of enterprise cooperation is. Under the mixed preference and social preference mecha-
nisms, the level of enterprise cooperation shows a trend of first rising and then stabilizing.
However, compared with the wealth preference mechanism, there is a lack of an initial stable
development stage, and when the gain coefficient is relatively low, the level of enterprise coop-
eration can be stabilized. This result shows that the improvement of the preferences in terms
of the breadth and depth of cooperation will enhance the ability of the investment and benefit
allocation in cluster enterprises. Therefore, this improved preference will replace the role of
returns to some extent. In addition, when the adjustment coefficient α is relatively low, with
an increase of the weight coefficient w, the level of enterprise cooperation in the network grad-
ually increases. This result may be due to the improvement of the preferences in terms of the
breadth and depth of the enterprise cooperation and the increasing position of some enter-
prises in the network, whose partners are more willing to choose cooperation strategies to
achieve greater benefits. At the same time, these enterprises will be dissatisfied because of the
Fig 3. The effect of the gain coefficient on the enterprise cooperation level in cluster innovation network under three mechanisms and different adjustment
coefficients.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.g003
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"speculative" and "free-rider" behavior of some partners and thereby change their own cooper-
ative behavior and partners, which would cause the network structure to change greatly. When
the network structure changes greatly, more enterprises will change their payoffs. Enterprises
that employ non cooperative strategies will change their cooperative behavior for greater prof-
its and, ultimately, improve the level of enterprise cooperation gradually. In addition, with an
improvement of the preferences in terms of the breadth and depth of the enterprise coopera-
tion, the interaction between cooperative behavior of innovators and network structure is
stronger, and enterprise cooperation is more strongly promoted, which is more conducive to
the evolution and development of the cluster innovation network. Therefore, to promote the
emergence of cooperative behavior in cluster innovation networks, consider the return situa-
tion in the network in advance. When the return intensity is relatively low, the appropriate
increase of the weight coefficient w can effectively maintain the level of enterprise cooperation
at a higher level. Correspondingly, when the return intensity is relatively high, the lower weight
coefficient w can ensure effective improvement in the enterprise cooperation.
4.4 Impact of the fairness preference and return intensity on the corporate
cooperative benefit in cluster innovation networks
Figs 4 and 5 reflect the respective impacts of the adjustment and gain coefficients on the coop-
erative benefit of enterprises with different cooperative breadths in cluster innovation net-
works under three mechanisms. It can be seen from Figs 4 and 5 that with an increase in the
weight coefficient, the profitability of enterprises with a large cooperation scale is gradually
enhanced, while the cooperation income of enterprises with smaller cooperation breadth grad-
ually decreases. The result is the phenomenon of “Care for this and lose that”, furthermore
income imbalance among enterprises in the network becomes increasingly apparent. At the
same time, the degree of enterprises with a wide range of cooperation is increasing, and the
quantity is also increasing. This pattern occurs is because with the increase in the preference in
terms of the breadth and depth of enterprise cooperation, the leading enterprises exhibiting
Fig 4. The effect of the adjustment coefficient on the cooperative benefits of enterprises with different cooperative breadths in cluster innovation network
under three mechanisms.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.g004
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broad cooperation have more substantial processes of profit distribution, which makes the
cooperation income of larger enterprises increase continuously and reduce the profit margins
of smaller enterprises. Therefore, the cooperation income of enterprises with smaller coopera-
tion scope is declining continuously. In this case, the enterprises with smaller cooperation
breadth will be dissatisfied because of their low income, hence, they will change their coopera-
tive behavior. Under the effect of the reconnection mechanism, these enterprises are more
inclined to R&D with the enterprises that have larger cooperation breadth to promote the
increasing number of enterprises with larger cooperation scope, and their ability to benefit is
also increasing gradually. In addition, with the changes in the network structure, the income
of more enterprises are also changing. Increasing numbers of enterprises with smaller cooper-
ation breadth will change their cooperative behavior because of dissatisfaction with their
income. However, due to the unfavorable environment of cluster cooperation, under the inter-
action between cooperative behavior of innovators and the network structure, the benefits of
enterprises with smaller cooperation breadth are gradually declining. Therefore, the increase
in the preference in terms of the breadth and depth of the enterprise cooperation has a
restraining effect on the increase in the incomes of enterprises with smaller cooperation
breadth and a promoting effect on the increase in the incomes of enterprises with larger coop-
eration breadth, which is not conducive to the common development of all types of enterprises
in cluster innovation network. The graph also reveals that with the increase in the gain coeffi-
cient r, the cooperative income has also increased. The enterprises with larger cooperation
breadth have higher cooperative benefit. This result shows that the return intensity has a posi-
tive effect on the promotion of the corporate cooperation income, and this effect particularly
significant for the promotion of enterprise cooperation income of enterprises with larger coop-
eration breadth. When the return intensity is continuously enhanced, this effect can effectively
promote the enthusiasm of the cooperation among various types of the enterprises in the net-
work, especially to enhance the cooperation incomes of enterprises with larger cooperation
breadth to promote the benign evolution and development of cluster innovation network.
Fig 5. The effect of the gain coefficient on the cooperative benefits of enterprises with different cooperative widths in cluster innovation networks under
three mechanisms.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.g005
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Figs 6 and 7 show the respective impacts of the adjustment coefficient and gain coefficient
on the cooperation income of enterprises with different cooperation depths in cluster inno-
vation network under three mechanisms. Figs 6 and 7 illustrate that among the three mecha-
nisms, the cooperative benefit of enterprises with smaller cooperation depth under a wealth
preference mechanism is relatively higher, and the corresponding benefit of enterprises with
Fig 6. The effect of the adjustment coefficient on the cooperative returns of enterprises with different cooperative depths in cluster innovation network
under three mechanisms.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.g006
Fig 7. The effect of the gain coefficient on the cooperative benefits of enterprises with different cooperation depths in cluster innovation network under
three mechanisms.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226777.g007
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a larger cooperation depth is relatively lower. Under the social preference mechanism, the
earnings of enterprises with smaller cooperation depth are relatively low, while those with
larger cooperation depth are relatively high. This result may be due to the increase in the
preference in terms of the breadth and depth of the enterprise cooperation, which enhances
the enthusiasm of enterprises with larger cooperation depth for cooperation and innovation
and reduces the same enthusiasm of enterprises with smaller cooperation depth. Under the
effect of the reconnection mechanism, the same types of enterprises in cluster innovation
network tend to cooperate, which makes the profits of enterprises with larger cooperation
depth increase continuously, while those with smaller cooperation depth decrease gradually.
The result is polarization, which is not conducive to the evolution and development of clus-
ter innovation network. However, the change in the network structure will change many
enterprises profits, and thereby aggravate the polarization phenomenon and increase the
income gap between enterprises with larger cooperation depth and those with smaller
cooperation depth. From the figure, we can also see that the cooperative benefit of both
smaller and larger cooperation depth enterprises are rising in cooperation networks with the
increase in the gain coefficient r. This result shows the increase of return can be promoted by
improving the investment and profit ability of both smaller-depth and larger-depth coopera-
tion enterprises, which will in turn prompt cooperative benefits in both smaller and larger
depth cooperation enterprises. In addition, with the increase in the adjustment coefficient α,
the earnings of enterprises with larger cooperation depth are gradually increasing. This result
is due to the increase in the difference degree of the previous income, the current investment,
the cooperation breadth and the cooperation depth, which enlarges the gap between the rich
and the poor among the enterprises in the cluster. This difference in the degree can effec-
tively enhance the position and power of enterprises with larger cooperation depth in the
process of investment and payoff allocation to give full play to their knowledge transfer and
cooperation innovation, this difference can also facilitate the promotion of enterprises coop-
erative benefit when they have larger cooperation depth. Therefore, the enhancement of the
interenterprise cooperation relationship is conducive to the promotion of the corporate
cooperative benefit, which is crucial for the benign evolution and development of cluster
innovation network.
5 Conclusions
This paper takes the cluster innovation network constructed by the weighted evolutionary
BBV model as the research subject. Based on network evolutionary game theory and fairness
preference theory, this study constructs a cluster innovation network evolutionary game
model that includes the investment index, benefit index, cooperation breadth index and coop-
eration depth index. Using simulation analysis, the cooperation level and cooperation income
in the evolution process of the cluster innovation network under fair preference and return
intensities are analyzed, and the following conclusions are drawn.
First, increases in the weight coefficient, the gain coefficient, the difference degree of the
previous income and the current investment can promote the level of enterprise cooperation.
The greater the degree of the difference of the weight coefficient, the gain coefficient, the previ-
ous income, and the current investment are, the more obvious the promotion effect of the
enterprise cooperation level is. Among these factors, the level of enterprise cooperation can
only be promoted if the gain coefficient reaches a certain threshold. In addition, the increase
in the degree of the differentiation in the terms of the breadth and depth of enterprise coopera-
tion has a restraining effect on the enterprises cooperative level. Moreover, the greater the dif-
ferentiation is, the stronger the inhibitory effect will be.
Evolutionary gamemodel and simulation of a cluster innovation network based on fairness preference
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Second, the increase in the adjustment coefficient and the gain coefficient can promote
increases in the cooperative income of enterprises, and the larger the adjustment coefficient
and the gain coefficient are, the more obvious the promotion of the cooperative income
of enterprises will be. The increase in the weight coefficient has a restraining effect on the
increase in the cooperation income of enterprises with smaller cooperation breadth and deeper
cooperation depth and has a promoting effect on the increase in the cooperation income of
enterprises with larger cooperation breadth and deeper cooperation depth. The result is an
unbalanced development mode of "Care for this and lose that" that is not conducive to the
common development of cluster enterprises. In addition, the increase in the enterprise cooper-
ation breadth and the enhancement of the interenterprise cooperation relationship can effec-
tively promote the improvement of the enterprise cooperative benefit.
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